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(Work in Progress) 
By Fernando García Argañarás 
 
PART I:  FROM THE OLD TO THE NEW 
While this paper concerns the Bolivian state-society complex, it is ultimately framed within 
the critical paradigm raised by international political economy.1/ That is, it examines in the 
Bolivian case the ways in which political forces (governments, institutions, individual 
actors) shape the structures through which economic relations and interactions are 
expressed, and conversely, the effects that economic forces (including the power of 
collective markets and individuals acting both within and outside them) have upon political 
structures and outcomes. 
Thus, I will look into some structural features of the Bolivian state-society complex, 
highlighting the changes now taking place under the government of Evo Morales. 
Particular attention will be paid to the degree to which the older Prebendary-Corporatist 
state form is actually been replaced by a new state form. Utilizing a framework that looks 
at long-term historical and structural changes, I will explore the actual content and current 
course of the Bolivian transition toward a “socialist horizon”, as Vicepresident Alvaro 
García Linera recently announced. While still preliminary, the results of this macro-
historical analysis of Bolivian reality will serve as a basis for further research.  
 
FROM ACTOR-BEHAVIOR TO SOCIAL FORCES APPROACHES 
In recent years, mainstream scholarship has emphasized the importance of social actors 
in leading political and economic change according to rational motivations and objectives 
(see Cohen, 1985: 663; Offe, 1990: 233; Escobar and Alvarez, 1992: 1-2, 4; and Eckstein, 
2001: 356). Yet, these have proved insufficient to account for the scope of recent 
mobilizations in countries like Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela and more so, in terms of 
explaining the structural changes attempted by their present governments. Thus, actor-
centered scholarship split into adherents to the rational-actor approach and a new identity-
based paradigm emerging in continental Europe and Latin America. Adherents to the latter 
perspective argue that one cannot apply rational-actor models to the new forms of 
collective action. From this standpoint, contemporary movements are not strategic 
responses to structural or economic inequalities, but self-manifestations in a struggle to 
broaden social and political recognition. These movements often take place in a local, not 
in the national arena (Cohen and Arato, 1992: 498, 510-11; Escobar and Alvarez, 1992: 5; 
Kitschelt, 1993: 14-15; Melucci and Lyyra, 1998: 203). The latter paradigm's emphasis on 
social actors constituting "collective identities as a means to create democratic spaces for 
more autonomous action" moved research and analysis in a more holistic direction and 




Nevertheless, the study of NSMs is generally post-Marxist and post-structuralist and often 
even informed by a post-modern understanding of social dynamics. It rejects Marxist 
notions of class struggles, and centers on individual group dynamics, arguing that 
generalizations obscure actual events because every organization is unique (Tarrow, 
1988: 423-4; Escobar and Alvarez, 1992: 5). The methodological and epistemological 
individualism of both approaches is evident. 
In the mid- to late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a shift in the Latin American NSM 
literature. Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar (1998), for example, argued that the state should 
not be ignored in studies of social movements. Nevertheless, even these more 
comprehensive approaches to New Social Movement research do not go so far as to study 
the interrelation between social movements and the state, much less the state in its 
relationship with the economic structure. To explain why and how the state often becomes 
crucial to effect overarching policy changes requires an approach that is both synchronic 
and diachronic.   
Based in part on Gramscian thinking about hegemony, Robert W. Cox opened the way to 
a historical and structural analysis of the interrelationships between social forces, states 
and world orders. In this vein, I start with the theoretical premise that structural 
transformations entail, by definition, modifications in the distribution of power within 
political, social and economic structures. Applying these concepts to the Bolivian case, I 
recognize that Bolivia´s social formation, in varying degrees, has gone through three major 
reconfigurations of power structures and relations: first, independence; second, the 
National Revolution of 1952; and third, the implementation of neoliberalism since 1985. 
Each of these periods has been characterized by the supremacy of a given social group. 
2/ We can further say that the state and society that characterized Bolivia since 1985 until 
recently, reflected both the attempts of the world order of the Pax Americana to extend its 
supremacy within Bolivia, and the social split and confrontation that neoliberal policies 
provoked internally, as certain social forces aligned themselves with the US and others 
resisted the implementation and consolidation of neoliberal transformations. As US 
leadership was challenged in civil society, but accommodating forces controlled the 
apparatus of the state and government, neither outright force nor full consent, was to be 
found in the political and social arena. Between force and consent there stood 
accommodation, punctuated by conflict.  
 
THE OLD ORDER OF THE PAX AMERICANA 
Let´s say that that the supremacy of the United States in the bipolar era coincided with a 
Bolivian state form whose structure and reproduction was marked by the productive 
organization and labor relations envisioned by the MNR-led revolution of 1952. The 
political economy of such structure has been traditionally defined as “state capitalism” or 
more specifically, “peripheral state capitalism”. I have analyzed the power relations of this 
period in terms of “prebendary-corporatism” (1993).  The political and ideological 




under the presidency of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in the mid-1980s and his last 
government in 2003.  Indeed, one can argue that his government was the (almost) 
successful culmination of the MNR´s long-term vision of entrepreneurial class formation. 
The explosive social climax of October 2003 unraveled the threads that had joined state 
and civil society, both under the state-centered (1952-1984) and the neoliberal (1985-
2003) stages of Bolivia´s process of entrepreneurial class formation. Broadly speaking, the 
ideas, institutions and social forces that had sustained either accommodation or resistance 
within the Bolivian social formation came to a point of antagonism such as was to redefine 
the links between the state and the socio-economic and cultural foundations that give form 
to political representation and legitimacy.  
In summary fashion, one can say that the older Prebendary-Corporatist state form was 
characterized by a centralist state, run by the middle class. This state, on the one hand, 
maintained social cohesion through a network of power pyramids for the exchange of 
favors and jobs, while, on the other hand, it strengthened its political cohesion by 
incorporating in its decision-making labor organizations such as the COB, FSTMB y 
CSUTCB. In terms that are no longer fashionable, we are talking about an alliance among 
the middle class, the peasantry and the working class (mostly the mineworkers); together, 
more or less united behind a discourse of nation-building. The political and institutional 
arrangements of co-government, the peasant-military pact and the increasing 
“professionalization” of the armed forces, as well as the Cold War alignment, bear witness 
to this class alliance.   
No doubt, we are referring here to the dominant configuration of social and economic 
forces, all of which stretched across and thorough the western geography of Bolivia. It is 
well known that this configuration of ideas, institutions and social forces stemmed from and 
were dependent upon the tin-mining economy. Its raison d´être was, among other things, 
the creation of an entrepreneurial class; one that, someday, would pull Bolivia along the 
path of modernization, or, at least, industrialization. 3/ In western Bolivia a counter-
configuration took slowly shape as well, centered around the radicalized Marxist factions of 
the working class and petty bourgeoisie.  
            
A NEW HISTORICAL MOMENT 
In the 1990s, the expansion of the market, the transnationalization of the economy, the 
expansion of the great Eastern landed estates, the development of agro-industries, the 
unsatisfied needs of large social sectors, and the increasing social unrest, all pointed in 
the direction of structural change a new configuration of forces rooted in eastern Bolivia. 
While the earlier “nationalist” period had been characterized by union-led collective action, 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and subsequent neoliberal governments had to contend for a 
time with a weakened labor movement, as the rank-and-file searched for and tried out 
alternative forms of social protest, economic development and political expression. The 
1990s, therefore, witnessed the consolidation of democratic rule, which, although limited 




macroeconomic “surveillance” of the Pax Americana, allowed for the emergence of a party 
system that came to be gradually recognized as a complementary form of political 
participation and representation (and not merely as vehicle for personal leadership).    
Widespread dissatisfaction with the economic and social consequences of neoliberalism 
brought to the fore anew ethnic and social cleavages, the reorganization of the labor 
movement and continued rejection of privatization policies. Neoliberalism and the Drug 
War, symbolized by Decree 21060 and Law 1008, therefore, accelerated the crisis of the 
state, which was underlined by new social mobilizations and punctuated by repression.  
While the old order cohered around the sphere of work and personal and family relations 
protected by the state, the emerging one converged around territory and culture, though 
without displacing family ties and personal bonds which often continued being essential to 
survive in an economy lacking stability and opportunities. The emergence of the Chapare 
coca growers, the “chola bourgeoisie”, the regional civic committees, the small Valley 
producers and the camba entrepreneurs, were all symptomatic of this change in Bolivian 
civil society. Step by step, the state itself ceased to be the main reference point, the 
privileged actor for the resolution of conflicts stemming from the existing power relations. 
New spaces opened up for political struggle and social action, as well as for production 
and accumulation: the municipality, the prefectura, the OTBs (Organizaciones Territoriales 
de Bases), the neighborhood committees (Juntas Vecinales), NGOs, the political parties 
themselves. El Alto´s COR (Central Obrera Regional), Cochabamba´s Water Coordinator 
and the six federations of coca producers, displaced the COB and FSTMB in Western 
Bolivia; and CAINCO, CAO and the Comité Pro Santa Cruz led in Eastern Bolivia. There 
arose the entrepreneurial, indigenist and neopopulist discourses, “land, power and 
territory”, the October Agenda.  
Hence, the crisis of the Prebendary-Corporatist state entailed the unraveling of the class 
alliance that had sustained the “national-revolutionary” developmental vision. Such 
unraveling took place along two axes: one, strongly national-popular; the other, 
conservative --both with a significant presence across all Bolivian regions. 
 
NEOCONSERVATISM VERSUS NATIONAL-POPULISM 
In the realm of ideas, neoliberalism proved ephemeral, at least in Bolivia. Its evident failure 
and unpopularity (other than in certain recalcitrant enclaves), however, did not lead to new 
ideas of proposals on the part of entrepreneurs and landowners, much less to an 
alternative horizon for the country. On the contrary, the economically dominant sectors 
have retreated to pre-liberal standpoints sustained on semi-feudal practices and values. 
Such were evident in the reactions of landowners in Alto Parapetí, in certain elements of 
the autonomic statutes initially drafted by Santa Cruz and Beni, as well as the corporate 
pressures exerted by the CEPB until the most recent presidential elections. One must 
remember that it was the coca growers´ “invasion” of the well-to-do neighborhoods of 




which detonated violent clashes with middle-class youth, all too ready to “expel” the 
outsiders from their territory. This type of self-interested bias, is not absent in the pro-
government camp, where “social movements” (which is to say, corporate unions) project 
themselves as pillars of the emerging state form. Notwithstanding, they are consistently 
reluctant to consider federalism as a national option or refuse to acknowledge that 
autonomic demands go well beyond the reach of the camba oligarchy. The results of the 
2009 elections proved sobering to both the pro-government and opposition forces, as it 
became clear that autonomous demands had been accepted once again by the 
government leadership, and that autonomous leaders, who won in only three departments 
(Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando), did so by relatively small margins. 4/ 
Since the establishment of the October Agenda as the bottom line for structural reforms in 
Bolivia, the successive electoral victories of MAS candidates has begun to break the 
bounds of long-standing critiques of the neoliberal model. To the degree that state policies 
have been more responsive than ever to rank-and-file demands of organized civil society, 
a new articulation of social forces takes shape. Rural citizens, the urban middle and 
working classes, both mestizo and “whitish”, increasingly throw their weight behind the 
process of change. It seems that at long last, Bolivia is coming up with a “national project” 
along uncharted development lines.  
 
A CONSTITUTION FOR CHANGE ROOTED IN TRADITION 
Simply put, a Constitution is a body of rules that implicitly or explicitly describes the form of 
government and ways of functioning of a State. Since ancient Athens, constitutional theory 
and practice has also incorporated a series of elements that limit the power of government 
over its citizens.  Historically, Western constitutionalism has come to be precisely defined 
by the development of mechanisms that limit the power of the State and place it under a 
higher law. 5/ In this manner, the modern state, of liberal origins, counts among its main 
elements a written or unwritten constitution, bicameralism, the separation of powers and 
judicial review.  This means that the Magna Charta of a modern state is, simultaneously, 
law of laws and subject to checks and balances as well as revision.   In the case of a 
democracy, sovereignty is thus unfolded, with the constitution reflecting the full rights of 
the people, as well as exerting over the people the full extent of its reach. 6/  
The new Bolivian constitution includes all the key elements mentioned above, but has 
generated a debate among purists who question and highlight either its “pro indigenous 
bias” or the “concessions” that right-wing opposition sectors wrested from the mostly leftist 
Constituent Assembly. Within this framework, let´s direct our attention to those elements of 
the pluri-national constitution now being implemented in Bolivia, so that we can ascertain 
the degree to which it contains either a liberal philosophic and political foundation or one 
grounded on indigenous customary Andean cosmology. It will be seen that what prevails is 
the liberal tradition, though accompanied no doubt by elements rooted in European 
socialism and selective aspects of the Andean worldview. At least on paper, all these 




DOMINIUM POLITICUM AND REPUBLICANISM 
It is good to acknowledge at the start, that Bolivia´s Constituent Assembly –and the very 
constitution drafted by it –, as such, have their historical roots, unambiguously, in the 
English parliamentary and republican assembly tradition. That is, insofar as both are 
mechanisms and forms devised to give shape to and allow for the functioning of the state 
according to certain procedures and rules.  It was at the time of Oliver Cromwell, when 
James Harrington and Sir Henry Vane, from different standpoints, anticipate in their 
writings and advocated, the broadening of the political power of the emerging bourgeoisie; 
much the same way the Bolivian parliamentary left advocated the broadening political 
power of the emerging indigenous peasantry. In both cases, it was a matter of 
consolidating the parliamentary presence of the emerging classes and their parliamentary 
supremacy before the feudal aristocracy, in the English case, and the capitalist “oligarchy”, 
in the case of Bolivia.  In England, even the restored monarchy, which was consolidated 
after 1660, did not henceforth dare tamper with such supremacy. It remains to be seen 
whether the current parliamentary supremacy of the Bolivian popular classes will survive 
beyond the present regime.  
Indeed, Bolivia´s constitution carries out an analogous transfer of power: it enables the 
political displacement of the whitish republican oligarchy, which is nevertheless still 
entrenched socially and economically across the country. The ethnic and social 
composition of the new Plurinational Assembly – and especially, of the ruling party –, bear 
witness to this: mostly indigenous-peasant and mestizo-petty bourgeois. As in XVII century 
England, the main bone of contention now is land ownership.7/ It is not surprising then, 
that Article 398 outlaws the great landed estates, or that Article 394 guarantees 
community-owned landed property. It is not a coincidence either, that Bolivia is preserving 
(though broadening its representative nature) that quintessential parliamentary institution, 
whose need Harrington was adamant to defend: the senate.  
By the same token, the current concept of the separation of powers has evolved in 
interesting ways. During the English Civil War, only two powers were recognized: the 
executive and the legislative (which then included judicial functions). This lasted until the 
mid XVIII century. Subsequently, by the end of the XVIII century, distinctions emerge 
between the legislative, executive and judicial powers, starting with Montesquieu and 
some American constitutions (those of Virginia, Maryland, North Caroline, Georgia, 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire). Following this tradition, in the Bolivian case, Article 
12, paragraph I, of the new constitution establishes the “independence, separation, 
coordination and cooperation” among the organs of the state. All this, in order to guarantee 
the Civil and Political rights (Articles 21 to 32) of Bolivians before the state.  Furthermore, 
an innovation is introduced here, as a fourth power of the state is established, the so-
called Electoral Organ (Art. 12).  
Confirming the liberal roots of much of Bolivia´s constitution, there is an explicit guarantee 
for private property, whether individually or collectively owned, as well as for the rights of 




had said that the law was upheld more by interest than by will) and carried over in Bolivia 
by its republican constitutions as well.  Not to mention that the English feudal aristocracy 
and its organic intellectuals supported these rights, whether coming from the liberal or 
conservative wings. 8/  Yet, the right to private property left to itself would leave us 
accepting the doctrine that government, and even current society, exist to protect it and 
not to regulate it. Instead, the new Bolivian constitution, rejecting such doctrine, enshrines 
the concept of “social function”.  
 
THE ECLECTICISM OF PLURINATIONAL LAW 
The Preamble of the Bolivian constitution inverts traditional arguments and holds that the 
system of laws exists a posteriori to the explicit social pact of the community of citizens; a 
community that furthermore attempts to collectively rebuild the state upon new 
foundations.   As we know, every inversion maintains the structural limits of the original 
form, and, in this sense, it would appear that plurinational Right in the “Unitary Social 
State” can hardly be qualitatively distinguished from either English possessive 
individualism 9/, or Bolivian republicanism. But this is a half-truth: The introduction of the 
“social function” of property (Art. 56) to the juridical and political equation provokes a 
curious result:  it redefines civil power as the right to make laws, subject to sanction, in 
order to regulate power (economic, social and political) and no longer in order to preserve 
property. Hence the fit between a vision of acquired (and conditional) property rights, on 
the one hand, and the innovation of Social Control (Article 241), on the other.  This means 
that the Bolivian constitution preserves elements of classic political liberalism and 
republicanism, but introduces sui generis variants of seemingly socialist roots. 
Why “socialist”? Because it is the mode and relations of production of capitalism which 
generate that peculiar conceptual and some would say, ontological, division between “civil 
society”, the “state” and “economy”. They also produce political and ideological 
orientations accommodating or resisting the unfettered private accumulation of capital or 
its regulation by the state.   It is no secret that socialist ideas emerge in the XIX century 
precisely to limit or bring to an end that right created by and for the emerging European 
bourgeoisie.  
The powers of the Plurinational State are derived, given that the people have the supreme 
power to modify the legislative organ; and the executive is constitutionally  limited, both 
vis-a-vis the legislative as for reason that its prerogatives are restricted by the juridical 
framework. At any rate, the constitution regulates and limits the powers of the state itself 
as well as those that exist under the state´s economic and social jurisdictions.   The 
checks and balances do not refer only to the prohibition to fuse the public powers under a 
single organ, or to the delegation of powers among each other (Art. 12, paragraph III), but 
also refer to the inviolability of rights established in the constitution, and that “the state has 
the duty to promote, respect and uphold”. (Art. 13.) Title IV, Chapters First, Second and 
Third account in detail for the jurisdictional safeguards and courses of defense open to 




Furthermore, the constitution takes up from Rousseau and the Greek tradition the idea that 
the community is the principal instrument for moral education, and that political power is 
essentially an ethical issue. Most certainly, this vision is also implicit in the even broader 
cosmo-vision of Andean cultures, and is expressly enshrined in Article 8, Paragraphs I and 
II. But here it is not a matter of integrating Andean and Amazonian philosophy into 
Western democracy; it is not an issue of opposites that complement each other either. 
Rather, it is a question of a very pragmatic parceling out of constitutional principles and 
values which in addition reflect the multiple attempts to come to terms with opposition 
factions and their views. 
On the whole, what prevail in the Bolivian constitution are the republican and liberal 
traditions. Yet, Andean custom and tradition is to be found well entrenched in the articles 
that deal with Indigenous Peasant Jurisdiction (Articles 190-192); in those that refer to 
Indigenous Peasant Autonomy (Articles 289-296); in those that determine the powers of 
Indigenous Peasant Autonomies (Articles 303-304); and in the statements about the need 
to respect the plural economic model devised for “improving the quality of life and 
promoting good living” (Art. 306). One could add other articles referring to Land and 
Territory, but a good part of Chapter Nine is framed within an economic paradigm dealing 
with the regulation of land markets. This is to say, the regulation of the capitalist market 
according to social criteria. 
We must not ignore, much less underestimate, the fact that the constitution is much more 
than the sum of its parts. Conflictive, prolonged and spasmodic as was the process of its 
elaboration, approval, adjustment and eventual promulgation, the Political Constitution of 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia is a synthesis of struggles encompassing its ancient, 
republican and liberal past. Imperfect and variegated, it embodies the aspirations of a 
whole people.  
 
NOTES: 
1. IPE scholars are at the center of the debate 
and research surrounding globalization, both in the popular and academic spheres. 
Other topics that command substantial attention among IPE scholars are 
international trade (with particular attention to the politics surrounding trade deals, 
but also significant work examining the results of trade agreements), development, 
the relationship between democracy and markets, international finance, global 
markets, multi-state cooperation in solving trans-border economic problems, and 
the structural balance of power between and among states and institutions. Unlike 
conventional international relations, power is understood to be both economic and 
political, which are interrelated in a complex manner. 
 
2. We owe to Antonio Gramsci the criterion that “the supremacy of a social group 
manifests itself in two ways, as ´domination´ and as ´intellectual and moral 





3. It´s easy to forget that the initial “statism” (1952-1985) of the nationalist regime was 
a necessity and did not entail an issue of principle: simply put, there was no 
entrepreneurial class at hand to lead the nation-state. Within this framework, the 
indigenous character of the peasant masses took a back seat, as land reform and 
distribution and the preservation of the ancient ayllus in western Bolivia apparently 
did not threaten their ethnic identity but reinforced it. Insofar as the “Indian” masses 
accepted the nominal integration under the new state, and also, proved unable to 
pose their own alternative options for national development, they did not become a 
source of antagonism for the urban classes. Their de facto productive and 
geographic limitations (which did not extend to economic exchange), reinforced this 
perception. Ethnic and racial prejudices could now be disguised in terms of the 
universally accepted notions of “education”, “profession” or “trade”, if not so much 
now of family origin. This gave way to either paternalism or indifference. Progress 
would eventually assimilate them, and, if that were not the case, it would at least 
keep them at bay (García, 1993).  
 
4. The effects of the 2010 elections for regional governors are similar. As Miguel 
Centellas points out, “The 2009 Constitution formally recognizes “autonomous” 
regions and grants them significant jurisdictional powers. True, Morales’ Movement 
Towards Socialism (MAS) party expanded its support in these departments (even 
winning a majority in gas-rich Tarija). But after the April 2010 regional and 
municipal elections, Morales will no longer face popularly elected prefects backed 
by murky “civic committees.” He will face governors (the name change is not 
insignificant) backed by popularly elected, legitimate regional legislatures. In the 
December elections, voters in Bolivia’s highland departments also backed 
autonomy (by 70 percent or more), as did voters in Tarija’s easternmost Gran 
Chaco province in their own “regional” autonomy referendum. In both cases, MAS 
threw its weight behind autonomy—reversing its stance in a similar 2005 
referendum. (Americas Quarterly, “The Second-Term Challenges for Bolivia´s Evo 
Morales”, N/D).  
 
5. Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist:  "In framing a government which is to be 
administered by men over men, the greatest difficulty lies in this: you must first 
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to 
control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on 
government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary 
precautions." 
6. The first Word on the doctrine of sovereignty is in Jean Bodin, Seis Libros de la 
República, where he argues that Law is the sovereign´s will, and sovereignty is the 




7. According to John Adams, admirer of Harrington, “el poder va detrás de la 
propiedad”. As a matter of fact, Harrington believes that those who have an “over-
balance” of lands in their favor, in the long run, will control government.   
8. After all, it was Locke, who, without venturing as much as subsequent more 
democratic theories would, held that the legislative power is fiduciary and 
delegated  (as the majority acts in the name of the community).  
9. In Locke, the right to private property is derived from natural law, which is to say, is 
an innate and inviolable right. As a result, his political theory is as individualist as 
that of Thomas Hobbes.  See, Macpherson. C.B. (1962). The Political Theory of 
Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
